Thanks to RUSI and to NATO for arranging this timely event. Tribute to Deputy Secretary General’s role.

 

- Have five main points to make in looking at NATO’s role in Mediterranean security.

 

First, NATO is not a new actor in the Mediterranean region

 

- NATO has always been a Mediterranean as well as a Transatlantic organisation, in that it has always had members on the northern shore of the Mediterranean.

 

- The security interests of members of NATO have always been affected by what happens in the Maghreb and Middle East regions.

 

- Reflecting this, NATO members have always had a significant maritime presence in the Mediterranean, including the US Sixth Fleet. NATO itself for many years maintained a standing naval force for the Mediterranean.

 

- Since late 2001, NATO has had a specific maritime operation (Active Endeavour) in the Mediterranean. This has now hailed over 55,500 vessels and conducted 74 compliant boardings of merchant vessels.

 

- NATO’s interests in the Mediterranean Region are reflected in the establishment of the Mediterranean Dialogue 10 years ago.

 

- Progress since then has not been spectacular. But a regular process of debate has allowed the Security Policy communities to get to know each other. There have been some useful co-operative programmes:

 

- Of particular note are the twice yearly 26+7 military consultations - that must surely be the only forum where Israeli military staff sit down with the military staff of 6 Arab nations - and the successful NATO Mobile Training Team that has visited a number of MD countries to train staff officers on subjects such as crisis management and terminology. The NATO Defence College provides an excellent forum for MD participation on NATO courses and the Science seminar on desertification organised in Seville earlier this year was of specific relevance to the MD region.

 

- But overall, my own view is that the track record has been disappointing. Why?

 

Second, until recently, the Mediterranean has never been the real focus of the Alliance’s energies

 

- The Alliance’s focus has always been elsewhere. First, the Cold War. Then the wars in the Balkans. NATO itself was never a participant in the MEPP.

 

- Mediterranean countries have rightly sensed that their region was never a high priority for NATO political energy or resources. To their question "What’s in it for us?", NATO had no good answer.

 

Third, that has all changed since 2001.

 

- Two big changes in the summer of 2001. NATO and the EU successfully prevented a crisis in Macedonia. This hopefully brought to an end the cycle of Balkans wars. Almost at the same time, 9/11 demonstrated a new level of threat to all our societies from Islamic terrorism with no clear political agenda but an unlimited willingness to kill.

 

- The summer of 2001 marked the end of Europe as the theatre of crisis. Transatlantic co-operation remains vital. NATO still has an essential part in that. But increasingly, the theatres of crisis are beyond Europe. In Afghanistan, Iraq and the Israel/Palestine issue (which the UK sees as a crucial priority in the coming months).

 

- So the focus of NATO nations has shifted decisively to the South and East. NATO’s own role reflects this: with the major commitment to stabilisation in Afghanistan, and the Iraq training mission. More energy is also going into the PfP relationship with the Caucasus and Central Asia.

 

Fourth point: this new focus led to the proposal at Istanbul for a strengthened Mediterranean Parnership and the Istanbul Co-operation Initiative.

 

- The DSG has already described the goals of what Istanbul described as a "more ambitious and expanded framework" for the Med Dialogue. Took inspiration from the success of the PfP programme, which has given NATO relevant experience in supporting reform and co-operation initiatives.

 

- UK would like to see the enhanced Med Partnership focus on issues such as co-operation on countering terrorism and WMD proliferation: increasing military interoperability including exercises; pressing forward with defence reform; and increased political consultations.

 

- We would see this co-operation developing through individual programmes, participation in relevant NATO training courses and PfP exercises.

 

- NATO far from the only organisation engaged. We would favour close co-ordination with the EU’s Barcelona Process, and with the OSCE’s own outreach programme.

 

- Going beyond the immediate Mediterranean focus of this conference, I should say a word about the ICI.

 

- US and UK took the initiative, in the run-up to Istanbul, for an expansion of NATO’s outreach further across the broader Middle East. We saw no reason to confine our co-operation to the 7 MD countries.

 

- The aim of ICI is to make practical co-operation available to any country in the broader Middle East region which subscribes to the broad aims of the Initiative, including the fight against terrorism and WMD. We deliberately did not want to set the geographical parameters too tight.

 

- We also wanted to avoid setting up a new political institution. We therefore put the emphasis on individually tailored programmes, responding to the interests and needs of the country concerned, and tapping into the same range of NATO expertise as is available to Med Dialogue partners.

 

- The countries which have shown most interest so far are those of the Gulf. DSG’s role here. Also Steve Larrabee/Qatar. We are looking forward to the first visits to NATO HQ by from teams from these countries to plan co-operative programmes.

 

Fifth point: NATO’s image in the Mediterranean and the wider region still lags behind the reality.

 

- Until recently, it was a reality that the Med Region was on the periphery of NATO’s main interests. No longer the case. Yet the perception of NATO in the region still seems to be of a US-dominated essentially military organisation. Many countries therefore are reluctant to develop co-operation with NATO given public assumptions that this reflected NATO interests in setting up a military presence in the region. Other countries may welcome NATO’s interests for the wrong reasons, as a provider of security guarantees against neighbours.

 

- In practice, the Med Partnership and the ICI both reflect a growing emphasis on NATO’s role as a political alliance, promoting values of democracy and respect for human rights rather than operating purely as a military organisation.

 

- The UK (and other NATO members) is very clear that the issue of reform in the Middle East is a vast and long-term issue. We know that the impetus for reform has to come from within. The role for outsiders should be to support home-grown reform initiatives. There are a number of important programmes in this area, particularly from the G8 and EU. NATO’s contribution can only be limited both in its subject area and the resources we can bring to bear. And it will only move forward if the countries of the region see it as in their interests.

 

- Equally, it would be a pity if the opportunities on offer from NATO to improve practical co-operation with the Med and Middle East countries fell through because of outdated perceptions of NATO’s world view or intentions. I recognise that Iraq has deeply affected perceptions in the region. But views on Iraq within NATO were also sharply divided. NATO has now been able to find common ground in looking to the future and helping train the Iraqi security forces, thereby helping to shorten the period where international forces are needed.

 

- I would hope that countries of the Med region would see this as a constructive engagement, and certainly not undermining the case for a strengthened Mediterranean Partnership with NATO.

 

- We are looking forward to a first Ministerial meeting of the Mediterranean Partnership in December. I welcome the DSG’s programme of visits to the Gulf states. Meanwhile, the value of conferences of this kind is that it gives an opportunity to debate the underlying issues of perception and intention, as well as the practical ideas for increased co-operation.